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PERSONAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS AND MANDATORY 




The aging of the populations in the OECD countries has prompted various calls for reforming 
the existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems. Currently, there is renewed discussion 
in the United States about partial privatization where a fraction of the social security payroll 
tax would be diverted to Personal Security Accounts. In this paper, we quantitatively evaluate 
the welfare effects of reforming social security by introducing a PSA with and without 
mandatory annuitization in an economic environment with bequests and borrowing 
constraints. Our setup allows us to assess whether mandatory saving or mandatory 
annuitization of accumulated PSA wealth at retirement is welfare enhancing, and if so, for 
what type of individuals. Our setup follows Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2003) and 
studies various pension schemes in a two-sided altruistic framework where social security 
provides insurance against individual income and lifespan uncertainty. This framework is well 
suited to consider the annuity role of social security for single individuals versus for 
households where families also provide annuity insurance to their members. 
    Our main findings can be summarized as follows: 
•  A majority of households prefer a PSA reform (with or without mandatory annuitization) 
over the current PAYG pension system. Aggregate capital, output, and consumption, as 
well as individuals' lifetime welfare, are higher in the reformed pension system. 
•  Mandatory annuitization benefits most households. 
    In light of these findings, structuring the social security reform along a two-tiered system 
with a safety net for low income households that do not have access to family insurance, and 
allowing all households to accumulate retirement wealth faster through PSAs, and finally, 
requiring some level of annuitization of this wealth appear welfare improving for a large 
fraction of households. 
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The aging of the populations in the OECD countries has prompted various
calls for reforming the existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems. Al-
most all European Union countries are already implementing reforms to min-
imize the ￿scal burden of the demographic shock on the individuals. Similar
reform proposals are also being discussed for the United States economy. In
2001, a President￿ s Commission to Strengthen Social Security was appointed
to formulate proposals that would help maintain the current PAYG system￿ s
bene￿ts for current retirees while improving the future pensions of current
workers through ￿ personal security accounts￿ . The Commission proposed
three plans. The ￿rst plan only recommended that workers make a volun-
tary contribution out of their social security payroll taxes into a Personal
Security Account (PSA), owned and managed by the worker and invested
in a well-diversi￿ed portfolio. The second plan extended this idea further
and recommended diverting 4 percentage points of the social security payroll
tax to PSAs while reducing the indexation of current pension by following
price increases as opposed to wage increases. The third plan introduces a
mix of add-on and carve-out approach such that a worker who chooses to
voluntarily invest an additional 1 percent of earned income may divert 2.5
percent of social security payroll taxes, up to $1,000 annually, to PSAs. Al-
2though plans 2 and 3 are clearly partial privatization plans, both plans also
guarantee 30-year minimum-wage workers a retirement income above the
poverty line. All 3 plans have the accounts owned by the participants and
these accounts can be bequeathed to heirs.
The current debate on social security reform in the U.S. has therefore
focused on the relative merits of the existing PAYG system versus some
form of partial privatization with a safety net for low income workers. In
its key features, the 2001 Commission￿ s proposals are similar to the reform
recommendations made by the 1997 Advisory Council on Social Security,
according to which there were three approaches formulated to solve the
long-term ￿nancial imbalance in the program:1
￿ Maintain Bene￿ts: keep them essentially as is, but tax them.
￿ Individual Accounts: an additional and mandatory contribution of
1.6% of payroll.
￿ Personal Security Accounts: Convert the current system to a basic,
￿ at bene￿t program, and 5% of the existing payroll tax redirected to
PSAs.
1The organization of the ￿ Council￿has since changed. Now there is a Social Secu-
rity Advisory Board (SSAB), an independent, bipartisan board created by Congress and
appointed by the President and the Congress to advise on matters related to the Social
Security and Supplemental Security Inocme Programs. Its most recent report in 2003
suggest acting as soon as possible to reform the system.
3All these political e⁄orts are attempts to change the current PAYG de-
￿ned bene￿ts program administered publicly into a two-tiered program with
a ￿rst-tier ￿ at basic pension ￿nanced in a PAYG manner, plus a privately
managed de￿ned contribution program. In the current de￿ned bene￿t sys-
tem, individuals are given insurance against life span risk as they receive
retirement bene￿ts as long as they are alive. On the other hand, a switch to
a de￿ned contribution retirement program can be designed to provide the
same insurance if the funds in the individuals￿accounts are required to be
annuitized. However, as Diamond (1998) points out, political feasibility ne-
cessitates that the accounts￿of the deceased be transferred to their estates.
Clearly, setting the rules about the distribution of the accounts of workers
who die before reaching retirement age is not a trivial task.2
A de￿ned contribution plan must also specify rules about how the funds
are withdrawn during retirement. There are several options: 1) the accumu-
lations in PSAs are used to ￿nance real annuities, 2) lump-sum withdrawals
2Boskin (1986) proposed a de￿ned contribution plan where individuals￿accounts are
mandatorily annuitized. His suggestion was to separate retirement policies into two parts;
the annuity part would provide actuarily equivalent insurance for retirement annuities,
disability, and catastrophic hospital care, where as the welfare (or transfer) part would
guarantee a minimally adequate level of retirement income to all citizens. Huggett and
Ventura (1999) studied the steady-state e⁄ects of a Boskin type reform. Their treatment
of the reform mimics the Boskin proposal and is quite di⁄erent from the PSAs suggested
above. First, the annuity part is ￿nanced in a PAYG basis. Second, bene￿ts are set equal
to the maximum of the ￿ oor bene￿t and the annuity part of the Boskin proposal. The
￿ oor bene￿t is proportional to output per worker, which is similar to the PSA reform.
The social security tax rate that ￿nances the annuity part is set equal to the actual U.S.
social security tax rate.
4are made, or 3) a combination of the ￿rst two whereby phased withdrawals
are made according to some formula and the remaining amount required
to be annuitized. The Advisory Council in 1997 made two proposals for a
de￿ned contribution system that di⁄ered in the way that bene￿ts are paid
to individuals. On the one hand, the PSA proposal places no restriction on
the form of bene￿t receipt. An intermediate position is the Chilean system
where there is a limit in the size of monthly withdrawals for any part of the
retirement account that is not annuitized.
As we mentioned above, Diamond (1998) argues that mandatory annu-
itization may not be the best option on how funds are withdrawn during
retirement if individuals care about leaving bequests to their descendents.
Regulation about how to withdraw funds during retirement is also not a
trivial issue if the individuals face binding borrowing constraints. Clearly,
establishing such rules are an integral part of the design mechanism for
reforming social security.
In this paper, we quantitatively evaluate the welfare e⁄ects of reforming
social security by introducing a PSA with and without mandatory annuitiza-
tion in an economic environment with bequests and borrowing constraints.
Our setup allows us to assess whether mandatory saving or mandatory an-
nuitization of accumulated PSA wealth at retirement is welfare enhancing,
5and if so, for what type of individuals.
Our setup follows Fuster, • Imrohoro… glu, and • Imrohoro… glu (2003) and stud-
ies various pension schemes in a two-sided altruistic framework where social
security provides insurance against individual income and lifespan uncer-
tainty. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals
that di⁄er in income and lifetime expectancy. The preferences are due to
Laitner (1992) whereby individuals derive utility from their own lifetime
consumption and from the felicity of their predecessors and descendents. In
this framework, an unfunded social security system competes with family
insurance to insure households members for the two types of risk mentioned
above. The family insurance takes the form of intervivos transfers and be-
quests. Overall, the economy consists of a rich set of households. There
are three general types of households depending on the number of surviving
household members. Type 1 households have only the children surviving and
the parents have died. Type 2 households have only the parents around and
the children have not survived. Type 3 households constitute the majority
and have both the parents and the children in the household. Amongst this
type, we do have further heterogeneity. Since the parents and the children
receive the realization of generationally-persistent ￿ ability￿shocks, type 3
households are further divided into four ability combinations depending on
6the high-low ability realizations of the parents and the children.
This framework is well suited to consider the annuity role of social secu-
rity for single individuals versus for households where families also provide
annuity insurance to their members. Our goal is to quantitatively evaluate
the proposed reforms along the lines of PSAs with or without mandatory
annuitization of PSA wealth at retirement in this setup where some house-
holds have higher desire to annuitize wealth than others. We calibrate our
economy to the U.S. economy, use numerical, discrete state-space methods
to solve the households recursive decision problem, and restrict attention on
steady-states under various pension system.
Our main ￿ndings can be summarized as follows:
￿ A majority of households prefer a PSA reform (with or without manda-
tory annuitization) over the current PAYG pension system. Aggregate
capital, output, and consumption, as well as individuals￿lifetime wel-
fare, are higher in the reformed pension system.
￿ Mandatory annuitization bene￿ts most households.
The paper is organized as followed. Section 2 presents the model in
detail, Section 3 contains calibration. Numerical results are given in Section
4, and concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.
72 The Model
The economic environment in this paper follows Fuster, • Imrohoro… glu, and
• Imrohoro… glu (2003). It is an applied general equilibrium model with over-
lapping generations facing lifespan and ability uncertainty, borrowing con-
straints, and exhibiting two-sided altruism. In order for the paper to be
self-contained, we will describe the model although some of the details can
be obtained in Fuster, • Imrohoro… glu, and • Imrohoro… glu (2003).
2.1 Demographics and Endowments
Our setup is a stationary overlapping generations model where every period
t a generation of individuals is born. Individuals face random lives and some
live through the maximum possible age 2T: If the individuals survive, then
his lifetime support overlaps during the ￿rst T periods with the lifetime sup-
port of his father and during the last T periods with the lifetime support of
his children. The total population in the economy consists of 2T overlapping
generations of individuals with total measure one.
For each period, individuals are endowed with one unit of time which
they supply inelastically to ￿rms as labor hours. Uncertainty at the individ-
ual level is introduced by a random variable z 2 Z = fH;Lg that determines
lifetime labor ability; z is a two-state, ￿rst-order Markov process with the
8transition probability matrix
￿(z0;z) = [￿ij]; i;j 2 fH;Lg;
where ￿ij = Prfz0 = j j z = ig; z is the labor ability of the father and z0 is
the labor ability of the new born in the dynasty .
The realization of the ability shock determines two features of an in-
dividual￿ s lifetime opportunities. First, z determines the individual￿ s age-
e¢ ciency pro￿le f"j(z)g2T
j=1: If z = H; the individual enjoys a permanently
higher labor productivity throughout his life-span than an individual with
z = L: Second, the realization of the labor ability shock determines an in-
dividual￿ s life expectancy. We will use  j(z) to denote the probability of
surviving to age j+1 conditional on having survived to age j for an individ-
ual with ability z for age j = 1;2;:::;2T; where  2T(z) = 0 and z 2 fH;Lg:
In order to develop economic intuition about how the model works, it is im-
portant to note that there are no private insurance markets in the economy
to diversify the risk of being born as a low ability-type individual. However,
the informal family structure and some partial annuities, public or privately
administered if they exist, do provide some partial insurance against this
type of shock.
9Cohorts shares are time invariant due to our assumptions of constant
conditional survival probabilities and population growth rate n. Using
￿1(z) = ￿(z)(1 + n)T to indicate the size of cohort 1 (newborns) with
ability z; relative to that of cohort (T + 1) (parents), where (1 + n)T is the
number of children per parent and ￿(z) is the measure of newborn individ-





; j = 1;:::;2T ￿ 1:
2.2 Technology
There is a representative ￿rm which rents capital, K; and hires labor, N;
to produce a single good using a Cobb-Douglas production function Yt =
K￿
t (AtNt)1￿￿, where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the output share of capital, Yt is output
at time t, Kt is aggregate capital input at time t; Nt is aggregate labor
input at time t; and At is an exogenous labor-augmenting technological
progress growing at a constant rate ￿. Capital depreciates at a constant
rate ￿ 2 (0;1):Firms maximize pro￿ts so that factor prices are set equal to
10marginal products
e rt = ￿K￿￿1
t (AtNt)1￿￿; (1)
!t = (1 ￿ ￿)K￿
t (AtNt)￿￿ (2)
where e rt is the rental price of capital and !t is the wage per e⁄ective labor.
2.3 Social Security and Fiscal Policy
2.3.1 Personal Security Accounts without Annuitization
Under a PSA system, retirement bene￿ts come from two distinct sources.
The ￿rst tier is a ￿ at pension bene￿t equal to 18 percent of per capita GDP
(a monthly payment of $410 in 1996). This portion of the total bene￿t is
￿nanced in a pay-as-you-go fashion by taxing current labor income. Hence,
the social security tax rate that ￿nances the ￿rst-tier system is set such that





￿j(z) b = ￿s!N;
where b denotes the ￿ at bene￿t, ￿s is the social security payroll tax to ￿nance
the ￿rst-tier bene￿ts. We can obtain the following close form solution for










The second tier of retirement bene￿ts is ￿nanced by forced saving. Every
period, the individual deposits 5 percent of earnings in PSAs. These funds
are owned and managed by the individuals, invested in the capital market
and therefore earns the rate of return on capital, and cannot be withdrawn
until the individual retires. The capital income accumulated in the PSA
is not taxed during the individual￿ s working life. The amount of second
tier bene￿ts is determined by the wealth accumulated in these tax-favored
personal security accounts.3 These assumptions de￿ne the following law of
motion of the PSA (for an individual of ability z)
(1 + ￿)sj+1(z) = (1 + e r)sj(z) + ￿!"j(z); (3)
where ￿ = 0:05; sj+1(z) denotes the PSA funds of an age-j + 1 individual
with ability z and s1(z) = 0: At retirement the individual gets a lump-
sum transfer of the wealth accumulated in his account which amounts to
(1 + e r)sR(z). If the individual does not survive to his retirement, his PSA
3We do not analyze whether these tax-favored accounts produce new saving. See
• Imrohoro… glu, • Imrohoro… glu, and Joines (1998) for the impact of tax-favored Individual
Retirement Accounts on saving in the United States.
12funds are transferred to his estate. Note that this reform is essentially a
partial privatization achieved by a mandatory saving program.
2.3.2 Personal Security Accounts with Mandatory Annuitization
In a modi￿ed version of the above reform, we consider the case of partial
privatization in which the funds accumulated in PSA are annuitized by the
institution managing the PSAs. At retirement, individuals are entitled to an
annuity payment, b(z); which we assume to be proportional to the wealth
accumulated in the PSA at retirement, that is, b(z) = p(1 + e r)sR(z); where
the proportion p is determined endogenously as we explain below: The an-
nuity payment remains constant during retirement, just like the ￿rst-tier ￿ at
PAYG bene￿t.
In order to compute the annuity payment of each individual, the social
security system has to determine the proportion p of accumulated wealth
that the individual receives during retirement. This variable p is set such
that, the expected present value of the aggregate annuity payments of the
generation that retires today equals the aggregate wealth held in PSA (the
funds of individuals that are alive at retirement plus the funds of individuals
that die before reaching retirement).4 The expected present value of the
4Notice that, p is computed for the generation that retires in a given period and that
13aggregate annuity payments across individuals that retire today is given by
X
z









the aggregate wealth accumulated in PSA by individuals, in this cohort,
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 i(z): As a result, the proportion p the de￿nes the annuity pay-
ments must satisfy the following condition:
p =
P




























The above condition implies that the return of annuities is linked to the av-
erage mortality rate across individuals with di⁄erential mortality (high and
low ability individuals) and, as a result, the return of annuities is not fair.
This return could not be o⁄ered by private annuities since it would not be
accepted by individuals with high mortality rate (low ability). In contrast,
the government can provide this return because annuities are mandatory.
we do not index p by time because we are assuming a stationary equilibrium.
14In other words, the government can overcome an adverse selection problem
(private information on di⁄erential mortality) in the annuity market because
PSA are mandatory annuitized.
The law of motion of the aggregate wealth held in PSA by the social
security system is






b(z)(1 + ￿)R￿j￿j(z) denotes the aggregate annuity pay-
ments at period t; if they were given the option. At each period t; the
aggregate funds in PSA, Wt are invested in the capital market.
2.3.3 Government Budget
In addition to the administration of the pension system, the government
taxes labor income, capital income and consumption in order to ￿nance
exogenously given government purchases. We assume that the government￿ s
budget is balanced each period. Since tax rates and government expenditure
are exogenous, the budget is balanced by an endogenous lump-sum transfer
to the individuals. The government also collects the asset holdings and
capital income of individuals that die without descendents. These resources
15are transferred in a lump-sum fashion to all survivors.5
2.4 Preferences
The preference structure in our setup follows Laitner (1992)￿ s two-sided
altruistic speci￿cation in which individuals derive utility from their own
lifetime consumption and from the felicity of their predecessors and descen-
dants. This framework allows us to evaluate the annuity role of various
social security institutions when families can also provide annuity insurance
to their members. Furthermore, in this setup, strategic behavior between
the father and the children does not arise because their decisions maximize
the same objective function. Therefore, due to this commonality of interests
during the periods when their lives overlap , the father and the children
constitute a single decision unit by pooling their resources. We call this
decision unit a ￿ household￿which is constituted by an adult male, the fa-
ther, of generation j and age T + 1; and his m = (1 + n)T adult children
of generation j + T and age 1. A household survives T periods or until the
father and the children have died.6 A dynasty consists of a sequence of
5In previous work, we have experimented with other distribution schemes for unin-
tended bequests. Since the ￿ ow of these is only a small fraction of per person income, our
quantitative results are robust to other schemes.
6We are assuming that, In a given household, all children are born at the same period
and all of them die at the same period. Furthermore, we take all children in a given
household to be identical regarding their labor abilities and vector of conditional survival
probabilities.
16households that belong to the same family line. If the children survive to
age T +1, each of them becomes a father in the ￿ next-generation household￿
of the same dynasty. Otherwise, the family line is broken, and this dynasty
is over. Since the population experiences broken dynasties every period, we
assume that these dynasties are replaced by new dynasties to maintain our
assumption of a stationary demographic structure. Since mortality rates
are higher for low ability individuals, the number of new dynasties of low
ability is higher than the number of dynasties of high ability. A new dynasty
begins with an individual of age 1 that holds zero assets.
Households are heterogeneous with respect to their asset holdings, age,
abilities, and their composition. When the father or his m children die,
the household composition changes. Because we assume that the life-span
shocks that a⁄ects each of the children are perfectly correlated, there are
three types of households. Type-1 households are those where the father
has died. Type-2 households consist only of the father since the m children
have died. Households of type-3 are those where both the father and the
children are still alive.
The budget constraint facing an age-j household, where j = 1;2;:::;T ￿
171 is the age of the youngest member(s), is given by
[￿s(h) + ￿f(h)](1 + ￿c)cj + (1 + ￿)aj = [1 + r(1 ￿ ￿k)]aj￿1 (4)
+ej(h;z;z0) + [￿s(h) + ￿f(h)](￿1 + ￿2);
where ￿s is an indicator function which takes the value m if the children are
alive and 0 otherwise, while ￿f is an indicator function that takes the value
unity if the father is alive and 0 otherwise; h 2 f1;2;3g is an indicator of
household composition, r = e r￿￿; ej(h;z;z0) are the after tax earnings, cj is
the consumption of each household member; aj denotes the asset holdings
to be carried over to age j + 1; ￿1 is the lump sum redistribution of unin-
tended bequests left behind by fathers without sons and con￿scated by the
government, ￿2 is a lump sum transfer to balance the government￿ s budget,
and ￿c and ￿k denote the consumption and capital income tax rates, respec-
tively. All per capita aggregate quantities reported in the paper are divided
by the level of the technology, At; and therefore represented in e¢ ciency
units. As we restrict attention to steady-states, consumption, asset hold-
ings, lump-sum transfers, and earnings are in e¢ ciency units and constant
over time.





> > > > <
> > > > :
￿s(h)!(1 ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿‘ ￿ ￿)"j(z0) + ￿f(h)Bj+T(z) if j ￿ R ￿ T;
￿s(h)!(1 ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿‘ ￿ ￿)"j(z0) + ￿f(h)!(1 ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿‘ ￿ ￿)"j+T(z); if not;
where ￿s is the ￿rst-tier social security tax rate, ￿‘ is the personal tax rate on
labor income, and ￿ is the rate of mandatory saving. For the PAYG pension
system, Bj+T(z) denotes the pension at age j+T, which depends on average
lifetime earnings calculated using the wage at the retirement period, that is,
!=(1 + ￿)j+T￿R. For the PSA reform without annuitization, Bj+T(z) = b;
and for the PSA reform with mandatory annuitization, Bj+T(z) = b(z) as
described in the previous section. Note that an individual￿ s pension remains
constant during retirement while technology grows at the rate ￿: Thus the
pension per e⁄ective labor decreases during retirement at rate ￿, that is,
Bj+T(z) = BR(z)=(1 + ￿)j+T￿R: Put di⁄erently, the retirement bene￿ts of
successive cohorts increase at the rate ￿:
19For j = T; the budget constraint of the household is given by
[￿s(h) + ￿f(h)](1 + ￿c)cT + (1 + n)T(1 + ￿)aT (6)
= [1 + r(1 ￿ ￿k)]aT￿1 + eT(h;z;z0) +
[￿s(h) + ￿f(h)](￿1 + ￿2):
If the children survive to age T, (1 + n)T new households are constituted
in the dynasty and each of them will hold aT assets. If the children do not
survive to age T; the family line breaks.
The above budget constraints are designed for the PAYG social security
system, with the additional assumption of ￿ = 0: To represent PSAs, we need
to take ￿ = 0:05; and add (1 + e r)sR(z) to the right hand side of the budget
for the ￿rst year of retirement, and also keep track of the accumulation of
PSA wealth through equation (3).
It is assumed that households face borrowing constraints and cannot
hold negative assets at any age:
aj ￿ 0; 8j: (7)
Individuals obtain utility from their consumption and from their prede-
cessors and descendents consumption. We restrict the utility function to
20the CRRA class because we assume a balanced growth path for our econ-
omy. We will use the language of recursive economic theory to describe the
household￿ s decision problem.
Let Vj(a;h;z;z0) denote the maximized value of expected, discounted
lifetime utility of an age-j household with the state vector (a;h;z;z0): For a








+ ￿(1 + ￿)1￿￿e Vj+1(a0;h0;z;z0)
￿
subject to (4)-(7),
where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and
e Vj+1(a0;h0;z;z0) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
P3
h0=1 ￿j(h;h0;z;z0)Vj+1(a0;h0;z;z0) for j = 1;2;:::;T ￿ 1;
 T(z0)(1 + n)T P
z002fH;Lg ￿z0z00V1(a0;3;z0;z00) for j = T;
￿j(h;h0;z;z0) is the probability that a household of age j and type h becomes
type h0 the next period given that the father is of ability z and the children
of ability z0.7
7We describe the computation of the measures of households in detail in the appendix.
For a description of the solution method see Fuster (1999).
212.5 Steady State Equilibrium
A ￿scal policy is a set fG;B;￿‘;￿k;￿c;￿s;￿g: Given ￿scal policy, a station-
ary recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of value functions fVj(a;h;z;z0)gT
j=1;
households￿decision rules fcj(￿);aj(￿)gT
j=1; time invariant measures of house-
holds fXj(a;h;z;z0)gT
j=1; relative prices of labor and capital f!;rg; a lump
sum distribution of unintended bequests ￿1, and a lump-sum government
transfer ￿2 such that the following conditions are satis￿ed:
1. given ￿scal policy, prices and lump-sum transfers, households￿decision
rules solve households￿decision problem (8);





















sj(z)￿j(z) is the aggregate PSA wealth in the
economy, adjusted for growth;





Xj(a;h;z;z0)￿j(h;h0;z;z0); for j = 1;:::;T ￿ 1;











that is, new dynasties, holding zero assets, substitute for the family
lines broken during any given period;



















+ ￿‘! e N + ￿cC ￿ G;
237. the ￿rst-tier social security tax rate is such that the budget of the





Bj(z)￿j(z) = ￿s! e N;
8. the goods market clears
C +
h
(1 + n)(1 + ￿) e K ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) e K
i
+ G = e K￿ e N1￿￿:
3 Calibration and Solution
We are going to calibrate our model economy to the long run quantities
in the U.S. economy in order to conduct our counterfactual experiments for
reforming social security. Our main calibration target is the average capital-
output ratio in the U.S. economy over the last ￿fty years, 2.5. Table 1 shows
the major modeling and calibration choices made.
24Table 1: List of Parameters
Population
2T = 14 Maximum lifetime (70 years)
R = 10 Retirement age (45 years)
n = 0.012 Population growth rate (annual)
Utility
￿ = 2 Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
￿ = 0:988 Annual discount factor
Production
￿ = 0:0165 Annual rate of growth of technology
￿ = 0:31 Capital share of GNP
￿ = 0:044 Annual depreciation rate
￿(H) = 0:28 Measure of individuals with high ability
￿LL = 0:83 ￿HH = 0:57 Transition probability matrix of abilities
Fiscal Policy
￿l = 0:2 Labor income tax rate
￿k = 0:4 Capital income tax rate
￿c = 0:05 Consumption tax rate
G=Y = 18% Government expenditure to GDP ratio
25A newborn in our setup is a 21 year old individual; a model period is
￿ve years. Retirement is mandatory at age 65, and maximum lifespan is 90
years. The population growth rate is 1.2% per year, and the productivity
growth rate is 1.65% annually. Again, these are the averages from the U.S.
economy over the last ￿fty years. The depreciation rate is taken as 4.4%,
and capital￿ s share of GNP is 31%.
Fiscal policy is captured by a constant annual government-GNP ratio of
18%, and taxes on labor income, capital income, and consumption, at 20%,
40%, and 5%, respectively.
The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ￿ is set equal to 2, and the sub-
jective discount factor ￿ is taken as 0.988 in order to obtain a capital-output
ratio of 2.5.8
4 Numerical Findings
4.1 Aggregate Long Run E⁄ects
We summarize the long-run e⁄ects of various types of reform in Table 2. The
benchmark steady-state describes the current U.S. economy where pensions
are provided by a PAYG system with a replacement rate of 44% and a payroll
8For details of the calibration choices, see Fuster, • Imrohoro… glu, and • Imrohoro… glu (2003).
26tax rate of 9.44%. We set the values of aggregate variables in this steady-
state equilibrium equal to 100 for easy comparison with other steady-state
equilibria under alternative reform proposals.
Table 2: Aggregate E⁄ects of Reforms
￿ ￿ K Y r(1 ￿ ￿k) C
Benchmark 0:0944 0 100:0 100:0 0:0462 100:0
PSA+Annuity 0:0438 5% 109:5 102:8 0:0424 101:8
PSA 0:0438 5% 108:9 102:7 0:0426 101:7
Elimination 0:0000 0 106:1 101:8 0:0437 101:2
The steady-state labeled ￿ Elimination￿is an equilibrium where there is
no unfunded system at all and all individuals are left free to save the op-
timal amounts desired to support old-age consumption. The steady-states
labeled ￿ PSA+Annuity￿and ￿ PSA￿enforce mandatory saving at the rate of
5% of individuals￿gross wage income in each of the years during their work-
ing life. Not surprisingly, all three alternative steady-states exhibit higher
capital stock than the benchmark economy since the distortion on saving is
reduced with the decline of the payroll tax from 9.44% to 4.38%. Perhaps
surprisingly, the steady-states with mandatory saving yield higher aggregate
capital and consumption than the fully privatized equilibrium. This might
be due to the fact that the combination of the two tiers for retirement con-
27sumption under the PSA reforms with mandatory saving programs yields
a higher aggregate saving rate than the steady-state in which there is no
social security system.
4.2 Welfare E⁄ects
Table 3 shows the lifetime utility of newborn households for di⁄erent com-
position and ability types. The ￿rst row describes the welfare of households
at the benchmark steady-state. The second and third raws show the welfare
levels under the partial privatization proposals, and the last row depicts the
welfare of households under full privatization.
Table 3: Welfare of Newborns
Type 3 Type 1
￿s ￿ HH HL LH LL H L
Benchmark 0:0944 0.00 ￿48:66 ￿56:13 ￿55:72 ￿66:85 ￿46:89 ￿59:03
PSA+Annuity 0:0438 0.05 ￿48:24 ￿56:74 ￿53:69 ￿65:39 ￿46:01 ￿60:06
PSA 0:0438 0.05 ￿49:20 ￿57:47 ￿54:36 ￿65:66 ￿45:97 ￿58:73
Elimination 0:0000 0.00 ￿49:02 ￿57:25 ￿54:78 ￿66:62 ￿44:39 ￿55:66
Measure of types 0:147 0:110 0:107 0:530 0:025 0:080
Type 1 households prefer the elimination of the PAYG system entirely. In
28particular, they prefer elimination over partial privatization, with or without
mandatory annuitization. There are at least two reasons for their preference.
First, these households have no fathers who would generate the demand for
annuity insurance, and since these households are very young they would
rather not be subject to forced saving. Second, they might be facing binding
liquidity constraints and mandatory saving would then reduce their welfare.
Another way to get the same intuition is to compare their lifetime welfare
under the two PSA reforms. They prefer the one without annuitization for
the same reasons listed above. In addition, type 1 households prefer the
PSA reform to the PAYG benchmark.
For type 3 households, the proposed PSA reform bene￿ts those with
low preference for annuity insurance. In particular, the households with
low life expectancy fathers (LL and LH households) are better o⁄, where as
households with long life expectancy fathers (HH and HL households) are
worse o⁄, relative to the benchmark PAYG social security system.
A great majority of type 3 households prefer to be born into the steady-
state labeled ￿ PSA+Annuity￿where there is mandatory saving at the 5% rate
and wealth generated by this partial privatization program is annuitized at
retirement.9 This ￿nding might seem surprising since our households care
9Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1999) also ￿nd annuitization welfare enhancing in
their study of various social security reforms in a pure life cycle setting.
29about leaving bequests to their relatives. However, since fathers are alive
in these households, they like to hold annuities and therefore mandatory
annuitization does not lower their welfare. Moreover, the fathers are very
close to retirement age and the timing of annuitization is also in line with the
households￿desire to hold annuities to insure the soon-to-be retirees. The
HL households prefer the PAYG system. These households bene￿t from the
progressivity of the PAYG system because of the low ability son, and the
and they also receive a generous pension for the high ability father.
The proposed PSA reform bene￿ts LH and LL type households and hurts
HH and HL type households, relative to the benchmark equilibrium. This
may be due to the fact that PSA does not provide annuity insurance against
lifespan uncertainty while PAYG social security does so in the benchmark
equilibrium. In fact, under PSA and mandatory annuitization, all ability
types but HL enjoy higher lifetime welfare than in the benchmark economy.
To see how type 1 households feel about the proposed reforms, Table 4
calculates the rate of return to ￿ social security￿for H and L types.10
10With ￿ social security￿we mean the sum of the PAYG payroll tax and the mandatory
saving rate. See the Appendix for the computation of the overall rate of return on social
security.





In both steady-states with PSAs, the expected return on social security
at birth is higher than the after tax return on capital. In the case of PSA
without annuitization, there is some progressivity in the bene￿ts since there
is a ￿rst-tier which is a ￿ at bene￿t for every retiree. Indeed, the expected
return of social security is higher for individuals with low ability (5.41%)
than for the H types (5.10%). This di⁄erence between the returns for low
and high ability households disappears when part of the retirement wealth
is annuitized. In this case, high ability households enjoy a higher rate of
return (5.51%) than low ability households (5.49%) because H types have
a longer life expectancy than L types. Therefore, when the part of wealth
generated by mandatory saving is annuitized at retirement, a rationale for
introducing a ￿ at ￿rst tier pension is to compensate low ability individuals
for the fact that their expected life is shorter.
315 Conclusions
The current debate on social security reform in the U.S. has focused on the
relative merits of the existing PAYG system versus some form of partial
privatization with a safety net for low income workers. In its key features,
the 2001 Commission￿ s proposals are similar to the reform recommendations
made by the 1997 Advisory Council on Social Security, according to which
there were three approaches formulated to solve the long-term ￿nancial im-
balance in the program:
￿ Maintain Bene￿ts: keep them essentially as is, but tax them.
￿ Individual Accounts: an additional and mandatory contribution of
1.6% of payroll.
￿ Personal Security Accounts: Convert the current system to a basic,
￿ at bene￿t program, and 5% of the existing payroll tax redirected to
PSAs.
There is serious discussion to change the current PAYG de￿ned bene￿ts
program administered publicly into a two-tiered program with a ￿rst-tier
￿ at basic pension ￿nanced in a PAYG manner, plus a privately managed
de￿ned contribution program. In the current de￿ned bene￿t system, indi-
viduals are given insurance against life span risk as they receive retirement
32bene￿ts as long as they are alive. On the other hand, a switch to a de￿ned
contribution retirement program can be designed to provide the same insur-
ance if the funds in the individuals￿accounts are required to be annuitized.
However, as Diamond (1998) points out, political feasibility necessitates
that the accounts￿of the deceased be transferred to their estates. Diamond
(1998) argues that mandatory annuitization may not be the best option on
how funds are withdrawn during retirement if individuals care about leav-
ing bequests to their descendents. Regulation about how to withdraw funds
during retirement is also not a trivial issue if the individuals face binding
borrowing constraints. Clearly, establishing such rules are an integral part
of the design mechanism for reforming social security.
In this paper, we quantitatively evaluate the welfare e⁄ects of reforming
social security by introducing a PSA with and without mandatory annuitiza-
tion in an economic environment with bequests and borrowing constraints.
Our setup allows us to assess whether mandatory saving or mandatory an-
nuitization of accumulated PSA wealth at retirement is welfare enhancing,
and if so, for what type of individuals.
Our setup is a two-sided altruistic framework where social security pro-
vides insurance against individual income and lifespan uncertainty. The
economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals that di⁄er
33in income and lifetime expectancy. Following Laitner (1992), we specify
preferences so that individuals derive utility from their own lifetime con-
sumption and from the felicity of their predecessors and descendents. In
this framework, an unfunded social security system competes with family
insurance to insure households members for the two types of risk mentioned
above. The family insurance takes the form of intervivos transfers and be-
quests. Overall, the economy consists of a rich set of households.
This framework is well suited to consider the annuity role of social secu-
rity for single individuals versus for households where families also provide
annuity insurance to their members. Our goal is to quantitatively evaluate
the proposed reforms along the lines of PSAs with or without mandatory
annuitization of PSA wealth at retirement in this setup where some house-
holds have higher desire to annuitize wealth than others. We calibrate our
economy to the U.S. economy, use numerical, discrete state-space methods
to solve the households recursive decision problem, and restrict attention on
steady-states under various pension system.
Our main ￿ndings can be summarized as follows:
￿ A majority of households prefer a PSA reform (with or without manda-
tory annuitization) over the current PAYG pension system. Aggregate
capital, output, and consumption, as well as individuals￿lifetime wel-
34fare, are higher in the reformed pension system.
￿ Mandatory annuitization bene￿ts most households.
In light of these ￿ndings, structuring the social security reform along a
two-tiered system with a safety net for low income households, and allowing
all households to accumulate retirement wealth faster through PSAs, and
￿nally, requiring some level of annuitization of this wealth appear welfare
improving for most households.
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